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YODER - HARDWICKE DIALOGUE: DOES MANDATORY
QUALITY ASSURANCE OVERSIGHT OF ALJ DECISIONS
VIOLATE ALJ DECISIONAL INDEPENDENCE, DUE
PROCESS OR EX PARTE PROHIBITIONS?
Ronnie A. Yoder*
John Hardwicke*
Ronnie A. Yoder:
You have had read to you the topic that we will discuss--"does
mandatory quality assurance oversight violate either ALJ decision-
making independence, due process, or ex parte provisions?" The
answer to that, of course, is--it depends. And what it depends on is
whether you are in essence in an administrative setting with a judicial
administrative decision-making model or a bureaucratic administrative
decision-making model.
I will be addressing this question in the context of whether the
concept being presented is consistent with the Code of Judicial Conduct
as we have come to know it--as a general model code, and more
specifically, as a model code which the federal administrative law
judges have recognized as a federal model. More recently state
administrative law judges have recognized the code as an appropriate
model for state administrative law judges. If you ask the question in
that context, the answer is very clear.
"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all trial judges are
created equal, that they are endowed by their office with certain
unalienable rights, that among these rights are the right and the duty to
make and issue decisions without mandatory preissuance review by
anyone."
Now if you look at the question of mandatory preissuance
review from the standpoint of the Code of Judicial Conduct, you wind
up with a question of, not only is this a judicial model or a bureaucratic
*Administrative Law Judge, U.S. Dept. Of Transportation, Past Chairman, ABA
National Conference of Admin. Law Judges
My remarks are my own and not those of the Department of Transportation.Chief Judge, Maryland Office of Administrative Hearings, President NAALJ.
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model, but whether the people who function within that model are in
fact judges within the contemplation of the Code of Judicial Conduct
or are they merely called judges.
"Judge" is defined in the Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary
as "a public official authorized to decide questions." In a more general
sense, "judge" can mean anyone who hears and decides anything,
including dog shows, baking, dancing and athletic contests.
There are over 2200 non-ALJ federal hearing officers. Most of
them are want-a-be's who would like to be ALJs. There are 5500 state
hearing officers with varying degrees of independence and
qualifications. Being called a hearing officer or even an ALJ at any
level does not automatically confer judicial or decisional independence.
I should hasten to point out that my message here is not a
critique or a criticism of any particular state or the way it handles its
administrative adjudications. I recognize that there are political and
budgetary and other reasons why it be essential to establish what in
essence is a bureaucratic administrative adjudicative model rather than
a judicial adjudicative model. But if you are looking at a judicial
system, the judicial system depends on the independence, intelligence,
and integrity of the individual judge, not on bureaucratic review prior
to the issuance of the decision.
You might say these three eyes are the three I's of judgeship--
Independence, Intelligence, and Integrity. And if the judge has three
eyes, he has two to look out, one to look inward, and one to look over
his shoulder at an SMS (subject matter specialist).' When Solomon
said, "Cut the baby in half," he didn't ask a man or a committee
whether that decision was logical or consistent with precedent. He was
a judge with independence as contemplated by the Code of Judicial
Conduct.
In a judicial system, the quality of the decision and the quality
of justice depend on the quality of the judge. A bureaucratic system
depends on the quality of supervision and internal bureaucratic review.
I am concerned that an SMS system that is not consistent with the Code
of Judicial Conduct is not a judicial system. And if that is the fact, then
the public should be told.
IA Maryland term.
Spring, 1997 Yoder - Hardwicke Dialogue 77
The background of this discussion that John and I have been
having for three years was set forth in an article in the NCALJ 2
Newsletter sometime ago, VII Administrative Judiciary News &
Journal, 3 (Winter 1994). I'd hoped that was going to be in your
materials. I think it didn't make it into the materials, but essentially it
arose in 1994 quite by accident when someone described the fact that
there were SMS reviews in some of the central panel states. And at that
time, I suggested that mandatory preissuance review is antiethical to the
concept of judicial independence, and raises serious questions
concerning exparte communications.
Now we printed an article in the NCALJ Newsletter and John
submitted a response to that article in which he pointed out, among
other things, that he didn't think ex parte communication was a problem
here because the communications are not with a party. Id. at 4. Now
I didn't understand that at the time, but I've come to understand it better
since. The fact is that under the Maryland APA, the only kind of ex
parte communication that are prohibited are those with a party. And
John helped to draft that provision in the Maryland APA, so he knew
that very well.
However, if you look at it from the standpoint of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, there are two problems with that response. Firstly,
under the Code of Judicial Conduct, which we have put in your papers,
ex parte communications clearly relate to those other than those to
parties. And secondly, the response with respect to ex parte
communications does not address the decisional independence problem.
If you'll look at Canon 1, you'll find that the judge is committed
to sustain an independent and honorable judiciary. He should
participate in establishing, maintaining and enforcing high standards,
and personally observe those standards, so that the integrity and
independence of the judiciary may be preserved. In a commentary, it
notes that the independence and integrity of judges depends in turn
upon their acting without fear or favor. Canon 2 says that in addition
to being independent, you need the appearance of being independent.
So in addition to being proper, you have to appear to be proper.
2National Conference of Administrative Law Judges of the Judicial
Administration Division of the ABA.
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In Canon 3, it talks about exparte communications, and it says
that a judge shall hear and decide matters assigned to him. In 3(B)(7),
it says that you shouldn't have ex parte communications except in
certain enumerated circumstances. Under subsection (b) you can
communicate with an expert in the law if you tell the parties that you've
done that. Under subsection (c) you can communicate with court
personnel and other judges, and under subsection (e) you can
communicate with other persons where expressly authorized by law.
There are just four quick points that I want to make with respect
to exparte contacts. Firstly, the Code of Conduct makes it clear that ex
parte prohibitions apply to anybody, not just to parties. The only
people you can talk with are the people that the Code says you can talk
with.
So what are the exceptions to not talking with anybody? One
of the exceptions is that you can do it if it's authorized by law or
statute. Well the problem is, that in most cases, SMS review situation
is not authorized by law or statute, it is done by administrative
determination without any publication of the procedures that pertain to
it.
Secondly, a judge can talk to experts, but he has to notify the
parties. One of the ABA informal opinions--1346 in 1975--said that a
judge could not talk to a law school legal information center off the
record. And in that opinion, they said that "it is our view, [interpreting
the Code of Judicial Conduct] that the court personnel referred to in the
quoted Commentary refers only to immediate employees of the court
whose function is to aid the judge .... and over whose activities the
judge exercises supervision," ' which is not consistent with the concept
of SMS.
Thirdly, it says that the judge may communicate with other
judges. Prior to the 1990 amendments to the Code of Judicial Conduct,
there were a lot of judges across the country concerned with whether
they could even talk to other judges, because the Code itself did not
specifically say that. The commentary said that, but the Code did not,
so they amended the Code to specifically permit such discussions.
3ABA Informal Op. 1346 (1975) Available on Westlaw ABA-ETHOP Database.
In the article published by Steve Lubet,4 he says, among other
things, "These ex parte communications violated Canon 3(A)(4),
notwithstanding the fact that the principal purpose was to soothe the
feelings of a fellow judge. If anything, their tendency was to impede,
if not abrogate, both judges' adjudicative responsibilities."5 These were
communications between judges that were unsolicited. The Tennessee
Judicial Ethics Committee, in opinion 92-9, holds that a superior
supervising judge cannot attempt to influence the decision of a
subordinate, and in doing so, violates both exparte and independence
provisions.
Now, if we look at the question of independence, the question
arises--what is judicial independence? I started with the Declaration of
Independence because it reminds us of what it means to be free and
independent. In addition to that, if you look at the question of
independence, imagine what would happen if a federal district judge or
a federal ALJ or a state court judge who was either elected or appointed
was told that he had to submit his decision to someone else before it
could be issued. It wouldn't happen. And if it didn't happen, what
could they do to him. Nothing.
There was a reference to SSA decisions in the materials that
were submitted by John noting that there is some kind of review after
ALJ decisions within the SSA system. I would just like to point out
that the federal courts have recognized the independence of federal
ALJs. One of the indicia of recognizing that independence is the fact
that those judges are protected by statute as being independent, and
consequently, they are comparable to the federal judiciary in that
regard.6 In a series of SSA cases in the federal courts, they have
pointed out that the SSA job description for federal ALJs specifically
prohibits preissuance review of ALJ decisions.7 And they have
recognized that as one of the indicia in their own decisions on the
independence of federal ALJs. Thank you.
4Ex parte communications: an issue in judicial conduct, 74 Judicature 96 (August
- September, 1990).5Lubet, supra note 3 at 100.6Butz v. Ecoumou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978).
7Ass'n of Administrative Law Judges Inc. v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132, 1146
(D.D.C. 1984); Brennan v. Department of Health and Human Services, 787 F.2d 1559,
1562 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 985 (1986).
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ALJ John Hardwicke:
Thank you, Stan. I welcome this opportunity to discuss this
subject with Judge Yoder, and in the presence of all of you.
Unfortunately for Judge Yoder's position, it's not in accordance with
the law. And I will start by giving you cases, and you can jot these
down because the cases deal with the subject under discussion. And.
unfortunately for Judge Yoder, he can cite no cases, zero cases, which
hold that ex parte communications include judges of a peer level
discussing any legal or judicial matter except those cases where one of
the discussing judges has a personal interest in the subject matter.
Otherwise, there is no law on the subject favorable to his position.
Now let me give you the law that is contrary to his position.
The best case on judicial discussion is People v. Hernandez, 206 Cal.
Rptr. 843 ( Cal. App. 5 Dist. 1984), where there was a discussion
between two judges off the record by telephone. The court held that
that was not a denial of due process. The court says there is a
presumption of the honesty and integrity ofjudicial officers under the
principles cited in Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975), (cited in
Hernanadez, at 855) a major Supreme Court decision on prejudice and
bias within the judiciary. The court went on to indicate there is an issue
of fairness, but a discussion among judges is good and necessary.
In another case, US. v. Greenough, 782 F.2d 1556, (1 1th Cir.
1986), the question was propriety of a state judge discussing a pending
case with a federal judge. The state case was a criminal matter in which
the state court held off until it was tried by that federal judge. The
question was a discussion between those two judges. The court said,
"[I]n the states of this circuit informal dialogue between state and
federal judges concerning matters of interest in both court systems...
is affirmatively encouraged." 782 F.2d at 1559.
In the case of Cheeves v. Southern Clays, Inc., 797 F.Supp.
1570, at 1581, (M.D.Ga. 1992), discovery was sought of certain judges
in that district court system who had been in communication with the
chief judge about a pending case. And in this case, the district court.
"[P]laintiffs persist in referring to the pertinent oral and written
exchanges between Judge Fitzpatrick and Chief Judge Owens as
improper ex parte communications. . . . One problem with this
assertion is that the term 'exparte communication' is an ethical concept
the definition of which, [in the Canon] expressly excludes consultation
with other judges." Id. And they cite Canon 3(A)(4) for the proposition
that judges may discuss among themselves--where they have no
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personal interest-questions of the meaning and significance of issues
in a case.
There is an extensive discussion of this topic by Andrew
Kaufman, in Judicial Ethics, The Less-Often Asked Questions, 64
Wash. L. Rev. 851 (1989). Professor Kaufman had conducted a
seminar symposium among 9th Circuit judges, with a broad range of
ethical topics. Much of that discussion centered on the Hernandez
case, which considered the extent to which judges may discuss the
merits among themselves. Professor Kaufman stated, "[T]he hardest
questions relate to federal judges consulting with other federal judges
on the same court." Id at 857. He considers both a narrow and a
broader viewpoint. Prof. Kaufman concludes that even the most
narrow view that you cannot discuss among other judges questions
before your court, view is overcome by "a reasonable assurance that
the judge with responsibility is the one deciding the matter."' Id, at
857.
And I would like to point out that our authority, Kenneth Culp
Davis, who still is most authoritative in the field, raises this question on
page 302 of his treatise. He says, "May... [ an ALJ] talk over the
problem [in a specific case] with a fellow ALJ? If he has doubts on
any kind of problem, may he consult with the chief ALJ? May he have
a supervisor or an editor look over his report and criticize it for both
substance and form?" Davis says, "The operating answer to all of these
questions is, 'Yes."' 3 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise 302 (2d ed.
1980).
So, ladies and gentlemen, you know of course that we have
opinions contrary to what the courts have held, and I must tell you that
my respect and subservience to the law is through the courts and
through the common law system.
In my judgement, the best discussion of what a judge is, is
found in Freytag v. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S.
868 (1991), and I recommend this reading to all of you because there's
a wonderful opinion of the court, with a concurring opinion by Scalia.
This 1991 decision defines a "judge" what a judge is, when is a judge
not a judge, and the extent to which an Article III judge is the only
judge permitted in the system. And I'll read you briefly from Scalia, in
the concurring opinion. He says, "Today the federal government has
a corps of administrative law judges numbering more one thousand"
[--of course, it's up to almost 1400 now--]"whose principal statutory
function is the conduct of adjudication under the Administrative
Procedure Act." They are all executive officers. 'Adjudication,' in
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other words, is no more an 'inherently' judicial function than the
promulgation of rules governing primary conduct is an 'inherently'
legislative one.... It is true that Congress may commit the sorts of
matters that administrative judges and other executive adjudicators now
handle to Article III courts-just as some of the matters now in Article
III courts could instead be committed to executive adjudicators." 501
U.S. at 910. Scalia goes on to conclude that the only true independent
adjudicator is one who possesses life tenure and a permanent salary.
Scalia suggests if you have anything less than a permanent salary, you
are not an independent adjudicator.
And so since none of us here has life tenure or a permanent
salary, none of us is a true "independent adjudicator." Consequently,
ladies and gentlemen, the question before the house is the extent of
which our independence can and should be, indeed must be curtailed.
Independent hearing agency adjudicators, whose sole function is to
administer due process, may have reasonable limits placed upon their
work by persons who are equally dedicated to providing due process.
That is a reasonable limitation. And that in substance is the conclusion
of the matter.
Appraisal is not only desirable, it is necessary. One illiterate
opinion from your agency, one opinion which is contrary to common
sense, law and justice, will do more harm to the adjudicatory process
than you can imagine. And it also does more harm to the functions of
our work than anything else. But that doesn't mean that we can curtail
the freedom of judges to do what is right, nor deny their freedom to
make a fair conclusion to their case.
One morning in 1991, the phone rang in my office and I
answered it, and it was the governor of the State of Maryland. The
governor didn't say, Good morning, John, he didn't say, How are you
doing, he said, "One of your goddamn judges made a decision
yesterday which cost the State of Maryland 5 million dollars." That
was the high point of the conversation. I had read that decision of that
judge. I did not agree with it. It was, in my opinion, however, a well-
reasoned decision. The case went on to the Maryland Court of Appeals
and the Court of Appeals reversed the decision. To this very day, that
judge does not know that the governor discussed the decision with me.
My whole point, ladies and gentlemen, is that the beauty of a
central hearing agency is that when we institutionalize the due process
function, and take it out of the agency, the ability fairly to oversee is
greater. Consequently, there is a vast difference between what you can
do when you're outside of the agency, when you're outside of the
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prosecutor, when you're separated from the person who has some ax to
grind, when the only purpose in looking over the decision is to see that
due process was afforded, than when you are an employee of the
agency. There are reasonable limits. Thank you.
Moderator:
Judge Yoder has a five minute response.
Judge Yoder:
First of all, I'm pleased to observe that John and I really don't
have a dispute with respect to ex parte. Everything he said about the
cases which he cited referred to voluntary communications between
judges relating to decisions. The Code of Judicial Conduct specifically
says that's okay. The question is whether you can mandate that you get
approval or clearance before you issue a decision.
And in that regard, I don't want to load you up with cites, but
if you look at Association of Administrative Law Judges, Inc. v.
Heckler, 594 F.Supp. 1132 (D.D.C. 1984), it says, "The Social
Security and Administrative Procedure Acts prohibit substantive review
and supervision of the administrative law judge in the performance of
his quasi-judicial functions. His decisions may not be reviewed before
publication.... "(594 F. Supp. at 1146).
In a series of cases in the court martial arena, U.S. v. Mabe, 33
M.J. 200 (C.M.A. 1991), the U.S. Court of Military Appeals has made
it very clear that it's not proper for superiors to try to influence or
review the decisions by subordinates in courts martial. The court
stated, "We unequivocally reject this admittedly 'personal' view of the
military justice system and its concomitant undermining of the
independence of the military judge.... This coercion results from the
well-recognized effect of fitness-report evaluations on military lawyer's
service advancement and security." 33 M.J. at 205.
As stated in the Foreword to "Judicial Conduct & Ethics"
(1991) by Shaman, Lubet and Alfini, "[T]he essence of being a good
judge is, after all, the ability to decide the case on the facts and law
without any extraneous influences, and without fear that a reviewing
court, the siblings on the bench, the neighbors, the electorate or the
media are going to dislike the decision." I want to direct your attention
just briefly to the materials in your packet that describe the way SMS
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review is done in Maryland.' As an adjudicative bureaucratic model,
it's fine. I understand why John has it, because he has political
problems that he has to address. But it says that this SMS person is
first of all going to get a draft, not get a decision, he's going to get a
draft and review it. Then at the end of it, he's either going to say, you
can issue the revised draft after I've reviewed it, or he's going to say,
even if you revise it the way I've told you, you still can't issue it. He's
going to look at three things, and if the three things are okay, then he
can issue it. If the "applicable law" is identified and "logically applied"
to the facts, it doesn't matter if the SMS agrees with the "bottom line,"
it has to be issued.
Well, what is "applicable law?" I sometimes think constitutional
questions are applicable in civil penalty cases, but other judges don't.
What if I think the Declaration of Independence and the constitutional
right to free speech are relevant to the issue of predecisional review and
you don't? Does the inclusion of such an issue change the quality of
the decision? As an SMS, could I require an ALJ to consider the
propriety of the SMS system?
"Logical." What if the judge thinks his decision is logical, but
the SMS disagrees? Was Brown v. Board of Education 347 U.S. 483
(1954) logical? Was Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) logical?
Was my reversal of thirty years of CAB precedent in the Orbis case
when I first started twenty years ago logical? 9 My associate chiefjudge
didn't think so. But the CAB eventually did. Would an SMS think it
was logical? I gather that the memorandum in your packet from John's
attorney argues that my position here is not logical. Does that mean
that I couldn't issue a decision against the SMS system as a Maryland
AL? And I challenge any of you who are in this kind of a system--try
reviewing the question of whether SMS review in your system is legal
or consistent with the Code of Judicial Conduct. See if it gets out.
"Bottom line." What about the thousands of decisions that are
not the bottom line? Some people who read my decisions regularly say
they always read the footnotes first, because that's where I put the good
stuff. That's often where I incidently make more policy. Is every
ruling on a motion to discover evidence, bar evidence, grant summary
gHarwicke, The Central Hearing Agency: Theory And Implementation In
Maryland1 XIV J.N.A.A.L.J. 5 (Spring 1994).
9Tourist Enterprise Corp. "ORBIS," CAB Docket 27914, Order 76-6-18 served
June 7, 1976, p.8, n.9, aff'd, Order 76-7-98, served July 28, 1976, p. 3, n.5; Order 76-9-71
served Sept. 17, 1976; Order 76-12-140, served December 30, 1976; Recommended
Decision, served Oct. 7, 1977, p. 6, aff'd., Order 76-5-11, settled May 8, 1978.
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judgment or extend time a bottom line?
I'm sure the intent of mandatory predecisional review is to
assure quality in the decisional process, not manipulate free thought
and independent expression. Freedom is not necessarily neat and tidy
or without mistakes. Democracy is not a neat, tidy political system.
It's just better than any other. The Soviet Union tried for 75 years to
manage freedom. It didn't work. Mandatory predecisional review may
be able to work, but only as part of an administrative bureaucratic
system, not as part of an administrative judicial system.
I've been a federal ALJ for twenty years. During all that time,
I've supported growth and professionalism of state ALJs and state
central panels. I understand the need for a political compromise in
administrative management. I know central panel systems are
evolving; but I hope they'll evolve toward reliance on individual
intelligence, independence, and integrity, toward an administrative
judicial model rather than an administrative bureaucratic model- - or
at least tell the public. Thank you.
And now for the final word--Judge John Hardwicke.
Judge John Hardwicke:
Isn't this great? I love this guy. I haven't done this in a long
time--a long, long time.
Let's sort out the questions. As I see it, there are two questions.
First there is the ethical question. That's the ex parte question as is
embodied in Canon 3. The second question is the due process question,
and I think that involves an independent judgment. That is the
judgment of the courts that have looked at the question. Judicial
discussion, where there is no private interest of the discussing judge, is
not an ex parte question but may be a due process question. The cites,
I think, concur on that. Exparte traditionally, correctly, according to
such simple things as Black's Law Dictionary, Words and Phrases and
so forth, means a discussion with one of the parties or in preference to
that party in the case. I have no doubt as to the correctness of that
legal position. That is an ethical question.
As for due process, you have to be careful because the
comments confuse an independent judiciary with an independent
adjudicator. Now first of all, the independent judiciary as an institution
must be, and is, totally, completely, and inherently independent, with
no encroachments. The kind of encroachment we saw this morning
through Justice White is the kind of problem that our society and our
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civilization is faced with.
The second question is, that of the independent adjudicator.
There is no such thing as a truly independent adjudicator. Even the
Supreme Court watches the election returns, as Will Rogers once said.
Every adjudicator is limited as to income, position, parking space, and
all of the things that can be brought about to impinge upon his true
independence. Even the Scalia independent adjudicator with life tenure
and no salary controls has to have some constraint.
Is a judge free to be wrong? The answer is yes. But is a judge
free to be biased? Is a judge free to ignore the law? You say, well,
those are questions for a reviewing appellate court. There's no question
that those are for the reviewing appellate court. But it is awfully good
to try to get it right the first time, because the appellate reviewing court
gets into the action only at considerable expense and delay to the
system. Now I don't suggest at any extreme position one way or the
other. Nor do I think Judge Yoder does. I don't believe that anyone in
this room would say that a judge is totally free to send out any decision
and opinion that occurs to him or her. None of us would take that
position.
There must be some kind of constraint. There's the constraint
of reason, there's the constraint of logic, there's the constraint of law,
there's the constraint of reasonableness, and of literacy. All of these
things are built-in constraints , constraints on everything we do. So it
is entirely proper for a judge, a reviewer charged with the duty of due
process, to take a look at the work of otherjudges. Mandatory review
is something that Judge Yoder hits hard. He objects to the word
"mandatory." My experience has been that the judges who do not like
to be reviewed are the very judges who must be reviewed. Without a
mandatory system, the review would be meaningless. Thank you.
REMARKS OF PROFESSOR HAROLD LEVINSON, 10 FOLLOWING
YODER-HARDWICKE DIALOGUE, PROVIDING LEGAL
BACKDROP TO DISCUSSION OF ETHICS PANEL ON THE
SUBJECT: "DUE PROCESS, EX PARTE COMMUNICATIONS, AND
THE TENSION BETWEEN INDEPENDENT DECISION-MAKING
AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONCERNS"
Professor Levinson:
Intuitively, it seems obvious to all of us that a judge should
l°Professor, Vanderbilt University, School of Law.
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decide each case on the basis of evidence, legal authority and argument,
which are submitted to the judge in the physical presence of the parties,
or in documents which are served on all parties. Our sense of
fundamental fairness is offended if the judge receives communications
about the case from anybody, whether a party or not, behind the backs
of one or more parties. These intuitive notions provide the basis of the
law on ex parte communications. Inevitably, however, the matter has
become as complicated as any other area of the law.
There are three major headings for our subject: First, what is
the source of law? Second, what type of communication is prohibited
under that law? (Note exparte means out of the presence of the parties,
not by or for a party.) Third, what kinds of remedies are available after
a prohibited communication has been received? The answer to each of
these questions varies depending upon which jurisdiction you are in.
The only constant is federal due process. Even state due process varies,
depending on the state constitution.
Source of Law
On the question of the source of law, we start off with the
federal due process clause, which is only occasionally cited in the cases.
Why? Because most jurisdictions have in addition other provisions,
more specific, more detailed, which are more useful to cite than the
rather vague federal due process clause. The leading due process case
in recent U. S. Supreme Court history is Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1970). Goldberg said that one of the basic ingredients of due
process is a decision based on the record before the deciding officer,.
which implies "and in the presence of all the parties." But that case
was basically legislation, which was speculating on what a future
proceeding should look like, and it does not help us very much with the
messy details.
Each state has its own due process clause. Again, the state
courts seldom use due process as a measure of whether an ex parte
communication is proper or not.
After the due process clauses come statutes, such as the
administrative procedure acts, which deal with ex parte
communications; statutes creating central hearing offices; and statutes
addressed to specific agencies or programs.
Codes of judicial conduct provide another source. The
immediate question is, do they apply to us as administrative law
judges? The answer is, in some states they do, in other states they do
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not. In most states, a code of judicial conduct, based more or less on
the ABA model code, is promulgated by the state supreme court, for the
judicial branch of government. In most states, the supreme court has
no authority to impose a code of judicial conduct on administrative
judges. In some states, the legislature has done so by reference to the
judicial code. In other states, the director of the central panel has done
so, by administrative regulation. And some agency regulations
themselves pick up the code of judicial conduct.
The next source of law is case law interpretation of the above.
Furthermore, there are persuasive authorities, such as ABA codes,
which only are persuasive until adopted by a particular state organ of
government. There are ethics opinions of the ABA and of the states.
There is the law of other jurisdictions, persuasive but not controlling,
and of course there are scholarly and professional commentaries.
Types of Communications Prohibited
This varies depending on what jurisdiction's law applies.
Generally speaking, the prohibition against ex parte communications
applies to any communication about the merits of the proceeding- not
about the time of day, or the room in which it will be held, of course.
The prohibition obviously applies to communications with the parties
or their representatives. It does not so obviously apply to
communications between judges, as we heard in the debate.
One possible solution to the debate between Judge Yoder and
Judge Hardwicke is this: Does it depend on who initiates the
communication, and whether that person is expected to initiate it as part
of the climate or ambiance of the office?
What Kinds of Remedies After a Prohibited Ex Parte Communication
has been Received?
One possibility: Put the communication on the record and let
each party respond.
Second possibility: Disqualify the judge.
Third possibility: Enter a default order against the offending
party, available under the federal APA and under the laws of some
states.
Fourth: Initiate discipline against the offending party.
Fifth: Initiate discipline against the judge who presumes to
receive and consider an ex parte communication.
